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ABSTRACT
The Chandra X-ray Observatory (CXO), NASA’s latest “Great Observatory”, was launched on July 23, 1999 and
reached its final orbit on August 7, 1999. The CXO is in a highly elliptical orbit, approximately 140,000 km x 10,000
km, and has a period of approximately 63.5 hours (≈ 2.65 days). Communication with the CXO nominally consists
of 1-hour contacts spaced 8-hours apart. Thus, once a communication link has been established, it is very important
that the health and safety status of the scientific instruments as well as the Observatory itself be determined as
quickly as possible.
In this paper, we focus exclusively on the automated health and safety monitoring scripts developed for the
Advanced CCD Imaging Spectrometer (ACIS) to use during those 1-hour contacts. ACIS is one of the two focal
plane instruments on-board the CXO. We present an overview of the real-time ACIS Engineering Data Web Page
and the alert schemes developed for monitoring the instrument status during each communication contact. A suite of
HTML and PERL scripts monitors the instrument hardware house-keeping electronics (i.e., voltages and currents)
and temperatures during each contact. If a particular instrument component is performing either above or below
pre-established operating parameters, a sequence of email and alert pages are spawned to the Science Operations
Team of the Chandra X-ray Observatory Center so that the anomaly can be quickly investigated and corrective
actions taken if necessary. We also briefly discuss the tools used to monitor the real-time science telemetry reported
by the ACIS flight software.
The authors acknowledge support for this research from NASA contract NAS8-39073.
Keywords: Chandra, Space Missions, ACIS, Operations, Health and Safety, Automated Monitoring
1. INTRODUCTION
Just past midnight on July 23, 1999, the space shuttle Columbia lifted-off from Cape Canaveral, Florida. In its
payload bay lay the Chandra X-ray Observatory (CXO), the primary cargo of the STS-93 mission. Just under 8
hours after launch, Chandra was deployed from the space shuttle. However, it would be nearly two weeks later, after
an Inertial Upper Stage booster “burn” and several “burns” by its own propulsion system, that Chandra would reach
its final orbit. The CXO is now the third of NASA’s “great observatories” in space.
The CXO’s operational orbit has an apogee of approximately 140,000 km and a perigee of nearly 10,000 km,
with a 28.5◦ initial inclination. The CXO’s highly elliptical orbit, with an orbital period of approximately 2.65 days,
results in high observing efficiency. Moreover, the fraction of the sky occulted by the Earth is small over most of
the orbital period, as is the fraction of time when the detector backgrounds are high as the CXO dips into the
Earth’s radiation belts. Consequently, approximately 85% of Chandra’s orbit is available for observing. In fact,
uninterrupted observations lasting as long as 2.3 days are possible.1
The CXO carries two focal plane science instruments: the High Resolution Camera (HRC) and the Advanced
CCD Imaging Spectrometer (ACIS). The Observatory also possesses two objective transmission gratings: a Low
Energy Transmission Grating (LETG) that is primarily used with the HRC, and the High Energy Transmission
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Grating (HETG) that is primarily used with the ACIS. In addition to these instruments, Chandra also carries a
radiation monitor – the Electron, Proton, Helium Instrument (EPHIN) particle detector.
In order to maintain this high level of observing efficiency, a robust monitoring and alert system must be in place
to verify the health and safety status of not only the instruments themselves, but the whole observatory as well. This
requirement is a result of the fact that the CXO is not in constant communication with the ground. Communication
with the CXO is obtained through NASA’s Deep Space Network (DSN) of ground-tracking stations. Since the DSN
supports satellite operations of many different NASA missions, this resource is shared amongst all satellites currently
in space.
Chandra’s nominal communication schedule consists of 1-hour contacts spaced approximately 8-hours apart.
Therefore, over the course of one 24-hour period, the Chandra X-ray Observatory Center (CXC) receives telemetry
from the observatory three times per day for a total of three hours, on average. Of course, during the periods in
which the ground is not in contact with Chandra, routine science operations continues autonomously on-board the
spacecraft. Each week, a new set of command loads is generated, reviewed, and uplinked to Chandra for use in
the following week. These command loads contain all the necessary information for the observatory to execute and
perform a week’s worth of science observations and spacecraft maintenance activities. In a companion paper,2 we
review the command load inspection procedure for the ACIS instrument. The science data and observatory health and
safety telemetry are stored on Chandra’s solid state recorders (SSR). During a real-time communication contact, these
data are telemetered to the ground and transfered to the CXC for data processing (via the Jet Propulsion Laboratory).
Another paper in this volume3 discusses the monitoring and trends analysis of the SSR data. However, since it can
take as much as 12-24 hours for the SSR data to be processed, analysed, and hence a putative anomaly found, it is
vital that the health and safety status of the Observatory be quickly established during each communication pass.
In addition to telemetering SSR data, “live” or real-time telemetry data from the observatory and all instruments,
i.e., the current values of all the observatory and instrument house-keeping electronics, are sent immediately to the
Chandra Operations and Control Center (OCC) during each DSN communication pass.
In this paper, we focus exclusively on the real-time monitoring of the Advanced CCD Imaging Spectrometer
(ACIS) on-board the CXO during these one hour communication contacts. In Section 2, we provide a brief synopsis
of the CXO and its primary focal plane instruments while Section 3 illustrates the data flow from spacecraft to
monitoring. In Section 4 we discuss the method by which we arrived at our set of health and safety limits. In Section
5, we present the real-time monitoring schemes developed for the ACIS instrument. Our conclusions follow in Section
6.
2. CHANDRA X-RAY OBSERVATORY’S FOCAL PLANE INSTRUMENTS
The observatory consists of a spacecraft system and a telescope/science-instrument payload. The spacecraft system
provides mechanical controls, thermal control, electric power, communication/command/data management, and
pointing and aspect determination. This section briefly describes the two focal plane instruments on-board the
CXO, the HRC and the ACIS, while the main emphasis in this paper is the real-time health and safety monitoring
of the ACIS instrument. The AXAF Observatory Guide4 and the AXAF Science Instrument Notebook5 contain
a wealth of information about the CXO and its scientific instruments. More in depth discussions of the Chandra
mission, spacecraft, other instruments and subsystems are presented elsewhere.6,7,8,9,10,11
2.1. High Resolution Camera (HRC)
The High Resolution Camera, HRC, is a microchannel plate (MCP) instrument. It is comprised of two detector
elements, a ∼ 100 mm square optimized for imaging (HRC-I) and a ∼ 20 x 300 mm rectangular device optimized for
the Low Energy Transmission Grating (LETG) Spectrometer readout (HRC-S).
The HRC has the highest spatial resolution imaging on Chandra – ≤ 0.5 arcsec (FWHM) – matching the High
Resolution Mirror Assembly (HRMA) point spread function most closely. The HRC energy range extends to low
energies, where the HRMA effective area is the greatest. The HRC-I has a large field of view (31 arcmin on a side)
and is useful for imaging extended objects such as galaxies, supernova remnants, and clusters of galaxies as well
as resolving sources in a crowded field. The HRC has good time resolution (16 µsec), valuable for the analysis of
bursts, pulsars, and other time-variable phenomena but has limited energy discrimination, E/∆E ∼ 1 (< 1 keV).
The HRC-S is used primarily for readout of the low-energy grating, LETG, for which its large format with many
pixels gives high spectral resolution (> 1000, 40-60 A˚) and wide spectral coverage (3 - 160 A˚).
2.2. Advanced CCD Imaging Spectrometer (ACIS)
ACIS is the Advanced CCD Imaging Spectrometer. It is comprised of two arrays of CCDs, one optimized for imaging
wide fields (ACIS-I; a 2x2 chip array with 16 arcmin on a side), the other optimized for grating spectroscopy and
for imaging narrow fields (ACIS-S; a 1x6 chip array; 8 arcmin x 48 arcmin). Each array is shaped to follow the
relevant focal surface. In conjunction with the HRMA, the ACIS imaging array provides simultaneous time-resolved
imaging and spectroscopy in the energy range ∼ 0.5 - 10.0 keV. When used in conjunction with the High Energy
Transmission Gratings (HETG), the ACIS spectroscopic array acquires high resolution (up to E/∆E = 1000) spectra
of point sources.12 The CCDs had an intrinsic energy resolution (E/∆E ) which varied from ∼5 to ∼50 across the
energy range. However, due to radiation damage early in the mission, this has been significantly compromised.13,14
Nevertheless, approximately 90% of all Chandra science observation time available during the first four years of the
mission has utilized the ACIS instrument.
ACIS employs two varieties of CCD chips. Eight of the 10 chips are “front-side” (or FI) illuminated. That is, the
front-side gate structures are facing the incident X-ray beam from the HRMA. Two of the 10 chips (S1 and S3) have
had treatments applied to the back-sides of the chips, removing the insensitive, undepleted, bulk silicon material
and leaving only the photo-sensitive depletion region exposed. These “back-side”, or BI chips, are deployed with the
back side facing the HRMA. BI chips have a substantial improvement in low-energy quantum efficiency as compared
to the FI chips because no X-rays are lost to the insensitive gate structures but suffer from poorer charge transfer
inefficiency and poorer spectral resolution (prior to launch). In addition, early analysis from on-orbit data indicate
that the BI CCDs are more susceptible to “background flares”, which may compromise a measurement, than are FI
CCDs.15 These background flares (i.e., rapid increases in detector background) are thought to be a consequence of
Chandra’s radiation environment.11
3. OUTLINE OF DATA FLOW
As outlined in the Introduction, there are two data streams that are monitored for health and safety issues: (1) data
received from the solid state recorder, and (2) “live” or “real-time” data received directly from the CXO via the
DSN. In this section, we will briefly outline the data flow associated with the second stream. The former is presented
elsewhere in these proceedings.3
Once a communication link has been established with a ground-tracking station, real-time telemetry begins flowing
immediately to the CXO Operations and Control Center in Cambridge, MA. The relevant ACIS house-keeping
telemetry must be extracted from the raw telemetry before any health and safety monitoring may be performed. To
accomplish this task, a C++ software package called ACORN (A Comprehensive object-ORiented Necessity) was
written by programmers at the CXC.
In our implementation, the real-time raw telemetry stream is fed to ACORN via a User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) port. The raw Chandra telemetry consists of approximately 11,000 mnemonic string identifiers (MSIDs).
Every spacecraft and instrument sensor, thermistor, meter, etc. are identified and tracked via a unique MSID.
ACORN decodes the real-time telemetry stream and writes MSIDs, values, and spacecraft times to either a tab-
delimited file or standard output. For our purpose, ACORN-decoded data is written to a tab-delimited file so that
it may be analyzed. This entire process of real-time raw spacecraft telemetry to output files that can be processed,
is depicted in Figure 1.
4. DETERMINING ACIS HEALTH AND SAFETY LIMITS
In order to monitor the health and safety status of the ACIS instrument, a set of MSIDs as well as a set of limits must
first be established. In total, there are 65 ACIS MSIDs that are regularly sent by the instrument to the observatory
for incorporation into the telemetry stream that constitute the ACIS hardware “house-keeping telemetry”. These
MSIDs consist of components like the camera-body temperature to the ACIS focal plane temperature (please see
Figure 2). By and large, these are the principle electronic (i.e., voltages and currents) and temperature MSIDs
reported by ACIS.
Prior to launch, as well as during the first 2 years of the mission, there were several sets of “limits” used by
various teams within the CXC to ostensibly suit their own particular purpose. The original health and safety limits
(i.e., pre-launch) were established based on the qualification tests conducted during the instrumental and observatory
thermal-vacuum tests. Therefore, the first task was to update and streamline the use of various limit sets to one
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Figure 1. Real-time Data Flow: The pathway by which real-time telemetry from the spacecraft results in ACIS
monitoring web pages.
definitive set. Two years into the mission, after sufficient experience had been gained with instrument response to
on-orbit use, various members of the CXC convened to identify a robust set of limits to check against the real-time
ACIS telemetry feed.
It was quickly decided that one set of limits would not be desirable since there are principally two concerns that
would govern what the limits should be: (1) health and safety concerns, and (2) data quality concerns. Clearly, the
former is more important than the latter since the former is used to monitor and maintain vital mechanical operation
whereas the latter serve to indicate possible reduction in data quality. Moreover, the philosophy of the the health
and safety limits is such that should a “red” limit violation occur, the CXC response will be immediate. Should a
“yellow” limit occur, further analysis may be performed before any response would be initiated. With this operating
principle, two sets of limits were created for each MSID, with each set containing caution (color-coded yellow) low
and high values and warning (color-coded red) low and high values that would be applicable to health and safety
concerns as well as concerns that would affect data quality.
Nearly 300 days worth of data from the second year of the mission were analyzed to arrive at the ACIS health and
safety as well as data quality “yellow” and “red” limits. Limits from the MIT/ACIS instrument team were compared
against this 300-day baseline and modified on a case-by-case basis. For some MSIDs, the concept of either a low or
high “yellow” and/or “red” limit has no meaning and so these MSIDs were assigned a nominal value of “999” to
indicate such a condition. These limits are presented in Figure 2. Once this definitive set of limits was determined,
they were implemented by every group within the CXC that monitor the telemetry from the spacecraft. One caveat
that should be noted is that these MSIDs label telemetered sensor readouts such as the camera-body temperatures
and the various voltages and currents generated by the ACIS power supply (see figure 2). The ACIS focal-plane
temperature, FP-TEMP, is not included with the MSID values sent to ACORN but is extracted from the Digital
Electronics Assembly (DEA) house-keeping packets reported by the ACIS flight software. It is unavailable when the
flight software is halted or when the DEA house-keeping is disabled.
5. REAL-TIME MONITORING OF THE ACIS INSTRUMENT
There are two different ways in which the health and safety of the ACIS instrument is monitored. The first is by
monitoring and limit-checking the 65 ACIS house-keeping MSIDs discussed in the preceding section. The second
method is by monitoring the ACIS science data packets produced by the ACIS flight software system. The former
is discussed in Section 5.1 while the latter is discussed in Section 5.2. The principle difference between these two
methods is that the former monitors telemetry reported by the hardware components on ACIS, whereas the latter
monitors the science telemetry reported by the ACIS flight software.
5.1. Monitoring the ACIS House-keeping Telemetry
With the ACIS health and safety limits as well as access to real-time telemetry to perform limit-checking established,
we now outline the process by which the ACIS telemetry is monitored and key ACIS personnel notified in case of an
anomaly.
As stated in Section 3, ACORN produces tab-delimited ASCII files for a set of ACIS MSIDs. ACORN constantly
monitors a given UDP port for spacecraft telemetry. When the telemetry is flowing, i.e. when the OCC has
established a communication contact with the CXO, data from these MSIDs are appended to various ASCII files.
When the OCC is not in contact with the CXO, these ASCII files are not modified and contain data from the last
communication pass.
Three PERL scripts were written that facilitate the monitoring process. One PERL script (acis-read.pl) reads
the ACIS ACORN log files and calculates an average and sigma (based on 10 samples of data) for each MSID that is
followed. These values and timestamps are then written to another tab-delimited ASCII file. The second PERL script
(acis-www.pl) reads these log files and produces an HTML file that displays this information for team members to
inspect while at work, home, or on travel (see http://cxc.harvard.edu/acis). The HTML headers instruct the user’s
browser to ask for a new version of the page once every 150 seconds. This second PERL script also incorporates the
instrument “red” and “yellow” limits discussed in the preceding section. If a given MSID deviates from its nominal
value such that it falls within the “red” or “yellow” regime, the value for that MSID is either color-coded “red” or
“yellow” on the web page. A third PERL script (limitpager v1-4.pl) also reads the ASCII log files produced by
acis-read.pl. It compares the average value for each MSID reported against its database of “red” and “yellow”
limits. If a MSID breaches its nominal value such that it falls within the “red” or “yellow” value span, a pager
ACIS Limits Evaluation 
Health & Safety Data Quality
mnemonic yel lo yel hi red lo red hi yel lo yel hi red lo red hi description
1CBAT -70.50 -52.00 -75.50 -50.00 -63.00 -57.00 -75.50 -50.00 Camera Body Temp A 
1CBBT -70.50 -52.00 -75.50 -50.00 -63.00 -57.00 -75.50 -50.00 Camera Body Temp B 
1CRAT -137.00 -100.00 -142.00 -90.00 -130.00 -125.00 -142.00 -90.00 Cold Radiator Temp A  
1CRBT -137.00 -100.00 -142.00 -90.00 -130.00 -125.00 -142.00 -90.00 Cold Radiator Temp B  
1DACTAT 68.00 75.00 65.00 80.00 68.00 75.00 65.00 80.00 DA Collimator-Top Temp A 
1DACTBT -40.00 -5.00 -52.50 0.00 -21.00 -5.00 -52.50 0.00 DA Collimator-Top Temp B 
1DAHACU -998.00 0.16 -999.00 999.00 -998.00 0.16 -999.00 999.00 Detector Assy. Htr Current A 
1DAHAT Detector Assy. Housing Temp A Offset  
1DAHAVO -998.00 1.00 -999.00 999.00 -998.00 1.00 -999.00 999.00 Detector Assy. Htr Voltage A 
1DAHBCU 0.20 0.80 -999.00 999.00 0.20 0.80 -999.00 999.00 Detector Assy. Htr Current B  
1DAHBT Detector Assy. Housing Temp B Offset 
1DAHBVO 3.50 10.50 -999.00 999.00 3.50 10.50 -999.00 999.00 Detector Assy. Htr Voltage B 
1DAHHAVO -998.00 1.00 -999.00 999.00 -998.00 1.00 -999.00 999.00 DA Housing Htr +28V Input A 
1DAHHBVO 25.00 34.00 -999.00 999.00 25.00 34.00 -999.00 999.00 DA Housing Htr +28V Input B 
1DE28AVO 26.00 34.00 -999.00 999.00 26.00 34.00 -999.00 999.00 DEA +28V Input A 
1DE28BVO 26.00 34.00 -999.00 999.00 26.00 34.00 -999.00 999.00 DEA +28V Input B 
1DEAMZT -20.00 20.00 -37.50 40.50 4.00 12.00 -37.50 40.50 DEA -Z Panel Temp (RT830) 
1DEICACU DEA Input Current A 
1DEICBCU DEA Input Current B 
1DEN0AVO -6.70 -5.90 -7.50 -5.00 -6.70 -5.90 -7.50 -5.00 DEA -6V Voltage A 
1DEN0BVO -1.00 998.00 -999.00 999.00 -1.00 998.00 -999.00 999.00 DEA -6V Voltage B 
1DEN1AVO -16.50 -15.00 -19.00 -14.00 -16.50 -15.00 -19.00 -14.00 DEA -15V Voltage A 
1DEN1BVO -1.00 998.00 -999.00 999.00 -1.00 998.00 -999.00 999.00 DEA -15V Voltage B 
1DEP0AVO 5.90 6.52 5.00 7.50 5.90 6.52 5.00 7.50 DEA +6V Voltage A 
1DEP0BVO -998.00 1.00 -999.00 999.00 -998.00 1.00 -999.00 999.00 DEA +6V Voltage B 
1DEP1AVO 14.80 17.00 13.00 19.00 14.80 17.00 13.00 19.00 DEA +15V Analog A 
1DEP1BVO -998.00 1.00 -999.00 999.00 -998.00 1.00 -999.00 999.00 DEA +15V Analog B 
1DEP2AVO 23.90 26.50 22.00 28.00 23.90 26.50 22.00 28.00 DEA +24V Analog A 
1DEP2BVO -998.00 1.00 -999.00 999.00 -998.00 1.00 -999.00 999.00 DEA +24V Analog B 
1DEP3AVO 29.30 32.30 27.00 34.00 29.30 32.30 27.00 34.00 DEA +28V Analog A 
1DEP3BVO -998.00 1.00 -999.00 999.00 -998.00 1.00 -999.00 999.00 DEA +28V Analog B 
1DP28AVO 26.00 34.00 -999.00 999.00 26.00 34.00 -999.00 999.00 DPA +28V Input A 
1DP28BVO 26.00 34.00 -999.00 999.00 26.00 34.00 -999.00 999.00 DPA +28V Input B 
1DPAMYT -20.00 20.00 -37.50 40.50 1.00 14.00 -37.50 40.50 DPA -Y Panel Temp (RT810) 
1DPAMZT -20.00 20.00 -37.50 40.50 4.00 17.00 -37.50 40.50 DPA -Z Panel Temp (RT830) 
1DPICACU 0.90 1.75 -999.00 999.00 0.90 1.75 -999.00 999.00 DPA Input Current A 
1DPICBCU 0.70 1.75 -999.00 999.00 0.70 1.75 -999.00 999.00 DPA Input Current B 
1DPP0AVO 5.02 5.54 4.75 5.75 5.02 5.54 4.75 5.75 DPA +5V Analog A 
1DPP0BVO 5.02 5.54 4.75 5.75 5.02 5.54 4.75 5.75 DPA +5V Analog B 
1MAHCAT 210.00 998.00 200.00 999.00 210.00 998.00 200.00 999.00 Door Close Actuator Temp A 
1MAHCBT 210.00 998.00 200.00 999.00 210.00 998.00 200.00 999.00 Door Close Actuator Temp B 
1MAHOAT 210.00 998.00 200.00 999.00 210.00 998.00 200.00 999.00 Door Open Actuator Temp A 
1MAHOBT 210.00 998.00 200.00 999.00 210.00 998.00 200.00 999.00 Door Open Actuator Temp B 
1OAHAT -40.00 20.00 -56.50 36.50 -40.00 20.00 -56.50 36.50 Open Actuator Temp Cold, Side B 
1OAHBT -40.00 20.00 -56.50 36.50 -40.00 20.00 -56.50 36.50 Open Actuator Housing Temp, Side B 
1PDEAAT -10.00 50.00 -36.50 58.50 0.00 50.00 -36.50 58.50 PSMC DEA Power Supply Temp A 
1PDEABT -10.00 50.00 -36.50 58.50 0.00 50.00 -36.50 58.50 PSMC DEA Power Supply Temp B 
1PIN1AT -20.00 30.00 -36.50 36.50 -5.00 30.00 -36.50 36.50 PSMC Temp 1A 
1SSMYT -20.00 20.00 -37.50 40.50 8.00 20.00 -37.50 40.50 Suppt Structure -Y Panel Temp (RT811) 
1SSPYT -20.00 20.00 -37.50 40.50 8.00 20.00 -37.50 40.50 Suppt Structure +Y Panel Temp (RT810) 
1VAHCAT 210.00 998.00 200.00 999.00 210.00 998.00 200.00 999.00 Vent Valve Close Actuator Temp A 
1VAHCBT 210.00 998.00 200.00 999.00 210.00 998.00 200.00 999.00 Vent Valve Close Actuator Temp B 
1VAHOAT 210.00 998.00 200.00 999.00 210.00 998.00 200.00 999.00 Vent Valve Open Actuator Temp A 
1VAHOBT 210.00 998.00 200.00 999.00 210.00 998.00 200.00 999.00 Vent Valve Open Actuator Temp B 
1WRAT -90.00 -70.00 -103.50 -60.00 -88.00 -75.00 -103.50 -60.00 Warm Radiator Temp A 
1WRBT -90.00 -70.00 -103.50 -60.00 -88.00 -75.00 -103.50 -60.00 Warm Radiator Temp B 
FP-TEMP -998.00 -102.00 -999.00 -100.00 -122.00 -117.90 -999.00 -100.00 Focal Plane Temp 
 
Figure 2. ACIS Health and Safety MSIDs: This listing is a compilation of all the 65 ACIS MSIDs that are
monitored for health and safety reasons. A description and the corresponding “red” and “yellow” limits of each
MSID are presented.
From: <author>
To: <distribution list>
Subject: ACIS LIMIT TRIP!
ACIS ALERT During Current COMM Pass!
YELLOW_LO limit tripped 2 times!
********************************************
Check http://asc.harvard.edu/mta/RT/acis/www/acis−mean.html for latest info.
MSID: 1CRAT
Last Violation Value: −122.19
Current OBSID: 61094
Current Altitude / Direction: 53761 / A
Date and Time: Sun Aug 4 22:10:40 GMT 2002
Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2002 18:10:42 −0400 (EDT)
Figure 3. Email Alert Example: An example of what an email alert looks like when the MSID 1CRAT breaches its
“yellow limit”.
alert (for “red limit” violations) or an email alert (for “yellow limit” violations) is issued by the script to key ACIS
personnel so that they are immediately notified and so that corrective actions may be taken if required. To reduce
the probability of false alerts due to either spurious data or a “noisy” communication contact, the data violation
must persist for at least 3 samples before an alert is dispatched.
These three PERL scripts are executed every 5 minutes via a CRON task maintained by a general group UNIX
account. This way the thorny issue of permission and read/write priviledges is eliminated. When the OCC is in
communication with the CXO, the web page produced by acis-www.pl is updated with fresh values. When the
OCC is not in communication with the CXO, acis-www.pl reproduces the last values recorded from the previous
communication contact. Since the beginning and end timestamp for each MSID value that went into calculating an
average and sigma for that MSID is also presented on the web page, the reader is able to determine whether the
displayed value is representative of the current instrument status or whether it is an “old” value from the preceding
pass.
This web page, the ACIS Engineering Data Web Page, is a key element in monitoring the health and safety status
of the ACIS instrument, and is the primary means by which ACIS anomalies may be identified. Since this web page
is world-accessible, it allows key personnel of the CXC to monitor the instrument status whether they are at their
office, at home, or even on travel as long as they have internet access. In Section 5.1.1, we provide examples of what
was discussed in this section.
5.1.1. Examples
In determining the health and safety limits, it was expected that certain MSIDs would violate their nominal operating
range for certain well-known cases. For instance, it is expected that the cold radiators on sides A and B (MSID:
1CRAT and 1CRBT, respectively) would enter its “yellow regime” during perigee transit at certain times of the year
as the instrument tends to warm-up during this point in the Chandra orbit. Since the “red” and “yellow” limits
are designed to bracket this MSID’s nominal operating temperature range, we expect a violation to occur at perigee
transit. Please see Figure 3 for an example of what this alert looks like. Nevertheless, since this is a known condition
and since science operation is suspended when the CXO enters the Van Allen radiation belts, the email alerts that
would be spawned by limitpager v1-4.pl due to “yellow” violations by 1CRAT and 1CBAT are now suppressed when
Chandra is entering, at, or exiting from perigee transit.
Secondly, as was mentioned in Section 2.2, the spectral resolution of the front-side CCDs was found to have
been significantly reduced early in the mission. It is believed that the primary mechanism for this damage is the
Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2002 10:25:54 −0400 (EDT)
To: <distribution list>
From: <author>
Subject: ACIS LIMIT TRIP!
ACIS ALERT During Current COMM Pass!
YELLOW_LO limit tripped 2 times!
MSID: 1DPICACU
Last Violation Value: 0.80
********************************************
Current OBSID: 2953
Current Altitude / Direction: 135915 / A
Date and Time: Fri Apr 19 14:25:52 GMT 2002
Check http://asc.harvard.edu/mta/RT/acis/www/acis−mean.html for latest info.
Figure 4. Email Alert Example: An example of what an email alert looks like when the MSID 1DPICACU breaches
its “yellow limit”.
result of 100-200 keV protons scattering off Chandra’s mirrors and impacting the CCDs while ACIS was in the
focal plane during perigee transit very early in the mission.13,16,17 To prevent further damage to the ACIS CCDs, a
prevention scheme was implemented by the Science Operations Team of the CXC.18 One aspect of this scheme has
been to limit the orbital proton fluence and flux as measured by the proton monitors on-board the ACE and GOES-8
satellites. One way in which the low energy proton populations can become highly elevated occurs when the Sun
unleashes a coronal mass ejection (CME).19 Once the orbital fluence has reached its threshold value,18 or if one of
the EPHIN channels exceeds its threshold value,18 Chandra science may be suspended by ground intervention (in
the case of the former) or autonomously by the spacecraft (in the case of the latter). When this occurs, the ACIS
front-end processors are powered down and the Digital Processing Assembly’s (DPA) input currents decrease such
that a “yellow” violation occurs for 1DPICACU and 1DPICBCU. The email alerts generated by this violation serve as
a confirmation that Chandra has indeed suspended science operations because of such an event. Figure 4 illustrates
what this email alert looks like when 1DPICACU has violated its “yellow” limit. Since the ACIS Engineering Data web
page makes extensive use of color and includes various images, an example is not included in this paper (although
the URL is presented in Figures 3 and 4).
5.1.2. Peripheral Issues
Lastly, there are some peripheral issues that need to be addressed in order to demonstrate the robustness of the
health and safety monitoring. The first issue is one of redundancy. If the machine that hosts the CRON task were to
shut down either because of an electrical power failure or due to problems local to that host, the scripts would not
run, the web page would not be produced, and the limit-checking would not be performed. To solve this problem, we
run these PERL scripts and produce the ACIS Engineering Data web page on two different hosts so that we are not
prone to a single-point failure. One host, which produces and performs the “primary” web page and limit-checking,
is part of a “mission-critical” suite of SUN work-stations. Should this machine go down for any reason, at any time
of the day, the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory’s computer system group is tasked with the responsibility of
solving whatever problem may afflict the host as soon as possible. The second host, the “back-up”, is run on an
ACIS group SUN work-station. Secondly, two additional PERL scripts have been written that deletes old, obsolete
ACORN files as well as ensuring that the ACORN process is active on the CPU. If the ACORN process is not found
on the CPU, another process is launched. Both of these PERL scripts are also a part of the CRON task that runs
on both hosts. Since these have been the primary ways in which the web page may not have been always up-to-date
thus far in the mission, we believe we have now developed a scheme of PERL scripts that is robust to a single-point
failure and is one that can be relied upon to monitor the health and safety of the ACIS at all times.
OBSID: 2572 ACIS Monitor Bilevels: 01100101 Sent: 2002−212Z07:04:10 
VCDU: 127295:104 BEP: 7d8a8817 Fmt: 2 Seq: 13726 SCET: 2002−212T07:04:08 
2002−212T07:04:06 : BIAS ERROR THRESHOLD EXCEEDED BY FEP_3
 Serial Command CmdID  Result Code Bytes Boot:
Run: 3 Slot: 4 ID: 002a6034 Quad: FULL Start 2002−211T19:23:08 
Mode: TE/FAINT Exp: 3.2 sec Rows: 1024 Row1: 0 Sum: 1x1  Win: 0 
OBSID: 3724 FEP0: S0 FEP1: S3 FEP2: S1 FEP3: S2 FEP4: S4 FEP5: S5 
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 0 
SciReport Run: OBSID: Start: Bias:
Exps: Sent: FEP: CCD:
 Software Housekeeping  DEA Interface Housekeeping 
2002−212T06:51:09  SWVER
 TIMERCB_INVOKE 
2002−212T06:52:17  SWVER
 TIMERCB_INVOKE 
2002−212T06:53:24  SWVER
 TIMERCB_INVOKE 
2002−212T06:54:30  SWVER
 TIMERCB_INVOKE 
2002−212T06:55:37  SWVER
 TIMERCB_INVOKE 
2002−212T06:56:43  SWVER
 TIMERCB_INVOKE 
2002−212T06:57:51  SWVER
 TIMERCB_INVOKE 
2002−212T06:58:56  SWVER
 TIMERCB_INVOKE 
2002−212T07:00:04  SWVER
 TIMERCB_INVOKE 
2002−212T07:01:10  SWVER
 TIMERCB_INVOKE 
2002−212T07:02:17  SWVER
 TIMERCB_INVOKE 
2002−212T07:03:23  SWVER
 TIMERCB_INVOKE 
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 ADC_TMP_FEP1_RAM 
 ADC_TMP_FEP1_FB 
 ADC_FPTEMP_12 
 ADC_FPTEMP_11 
 ADC_DPAGNDREF1 
 ADC_DPA5VHKA 
 ADC_DPAGNDREF2 
 ADC_DPA5VHKB 
 ADC_DEA28VDCA 
 ADC_DEA24VDCA 
 ADC_DEAM15VDCA 
 ADC_DEAP15VDCA 
 ADC_DEAM6VDCA 
 ADC_DEAP6VDCA 
 ADC_RAD_PCB_A 
 ADC_GND_1 
00001024
 0x001f 
 15.3 C 
 13.4 C 
 20.1 C 
 16.8 C 
 20.0 C 
 18.6 C 
 14.2 C 
 21.0 C 
 17.8 C 
 20.9 C 
 19.9 C 
 14.4 C 
 −248.7 C 
 −119.7 C 
 −0.15 V 
 5.04 V 
 −0.15 V 
 5.06 V 
 30.56 V 
 25.06 V 
 −16.66 V 
 16.11 V 
 −6.41 V 
 6.04 V 
 0.05 m 
 −0.00 V 
ACIS Process Monitor, Wed Jul 31 03:04:10 2002
Figure 5. ACIS PMONWeb Page: The monitor receives Chandra telemetry from real-time contacts, extracts ACIS
fields, and writes an HTML file.
5.2. Monitoring the ACIS Flight Software Science Telemetry
The second method by which the health and safety status of the ACIS instrument is monitored each and every DSN
communication pass is via the ACIS Real-Time Process Monitor (PMON).
The ACIS PMON also receives Chandra telemetry during each real-time contact via a UDP port. A series of
shell scripts has been written that decommutates the raw telemetry, extracts ACIS science fields, and produces an
HTML file that displays these data. This HTML file presents information that is relevant to the ACIS science run
currently in progress. Information such as which CCDs are in use, the number of x-ray “events” found in a given
exposure frame, the overclock values for each node amplifier on a given CCD, etc., are displayed. A PMON HTML
example is presented in Figure 5.
When PMON receives fresh telemetry, it writes an HTML file every 30 seconds. Like the ACIS Engineering Data
web page, the headers in the PMON HTML page instruct the user’s browser to ask for a new version of the page
once every 30 seconds. However, when not in real-time contact, or in a non-ACIS telemetry format, some of the
displayed values may be very out-of-date. The user, normally ACIS operations personnel, must inspect the relevant
time fields to determine whether the data are still useful. As is the case for the scripts used in monitoring the ACIS
house-keeping electronics and temperatures, a PERL script has been written that checks to see if the PMON process
is active on the CPU. If it is not, another PMON process is launched. This PERL script is run every 5 mins via
another CRON task.
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2002 03:03:49 −0400 (EDT)
From: <author>
To: <distribution list>
PMON error reported by xcanuck at Wed Jul 31 03:03:49 EDT 2002
Spacecraft Time: 2002−212T07:03:39
Error Message: OBSID 2572 BIAS ERROR THRESHOLD EXCEEDED BY FEP_3
Check http://asc.harvard.edu/acis/RT/acisrt.html for latest info.
Figure 6. PMON Pager Alert: This is an example of a recent in-flight anomaly determined via the ACIS PMON
and the pager alert issued to ACIS personnel to announce its discovery.
Over the course of three years of successful flight operations, there have been three issues that the ACIS Operations
team (combining personnel from the CXC as well as the MIT/IPI team) have had to solve with regards to issues
of ACIS science operation. One, on a few seemingly random occassions, the ACIS bias maps have been interleaved
with ACIS science data. The effect of which is to compromise the science data for that particular CCD and unless
corrected, the condition will persist. Since this anomaly was diagnosed, changes to the way in which ACIS is
commanded via the weekly load have been made such that we have not seen a repeat of this anomaly, the cause of
which is still unknown. The second issue is one where the bias map reports a large number of parity errors. The
cause of this anomaly is also not known, however, we have not seen this condition since November of 1999 and it may
have been the result of a single-event upset. The last issue is one in which a fatal error is reported by the back-end
processor on ACIS. This causes software patches to the ACIS flight software to be lost from memory and requires
ground intervention by the ACIS Operations team to resolve. Since all three of these anomalies can be determined
via the ACIS PMON, a shell script was written that spawns a pager alert (since immediate attention is required) if
one of these anomalies were to occur during a real-time contact . An example of this type of alert is presented in
Figure 6 and a comment announcing one of these errors can also be seen on the PMON HTML page (the third line
from the top in Figure 5).
6. CONCLUSIONS
The ACIS instrument on-board the Chandra X-ray Observatory has returned some of the most exquisite, dramatic,
and detailed images of the x-ray universe ever seen. The information returned, and the knowledge gained from
these ACIS observations, has allowed us to explore another wavelength in rich detail that will undoubtedly propel
astronomy forward in this new millenium. However, the continued success of Chandra, and ACIS in particular, is
dependent upon diligent operation of the spacecraft as well as the prompt notification, and hopefully resolution, of
any anomalies encountered in-flight. In this paper, we have presented two distinct methods by which the telemetry
from ACIS during each and every real-time contact is monitored, and in the event of an anomaly, how alerts are
quickly dispatched to key ACIS personnel. As new anomalies are discovered in-flight, we will endeavour to find ways
to incorporate their monitoring within our current scheme. After three years of highly successful flight operations,
we believe we have developed a very robust and reliable suite of PERL and HTML scripts that will help ensure
ACIS’ continued success.
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